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Abstract. In this paper, we address the problem of building an
anonymized medical database from multiple sources. Our proposed solu-
tion deﬁnes how to achieve data integration in a heterogeneous network
of many clinical institutions, while preserving data utility and patients’
privacy. The contribution of the paper is twofold: Firstly, we propose
a secure and scalable cloud eHealth architecture to store and exchange
patients’ data for the treatment. Secondly, we present an algorithm for
eﬃcient aggregation of the health data for the research purposes from
multiple sources independently.
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1 Introduction
While building an anonymized database from multiple sources of individuals’
sensitive data the privacy of a person may be violated. Even if the data are locally
anonymized, their aggregation can still reveal sensitive information, especially if
the data about an individual are distributed between diﬀerent local databases
[2,3]. Several models in the area of distributed privacy-preserving data publish-
ing have already been proposed (i.e., pseudonymization [9,26], secure multi-party
computations (SMC) [6], microaggregation [22], cloning [2]). However, those
models signiﬁcantly aﬀect the utility of the data, and, therefore, an eﬃcient
independent release of the data from multiple sources and their aggregation
without violation of privacy remains an open problem [10].
This problem is of great interest especially in the case of secondary use of
medical data. This includes the analysis of patients healthcare data in order to
enhance their health care experiences and the expansion of knowledge about
diﬀerent diseases and appropriate treatment. Datasets containing health related
information about an individual are increasingly becoming “open”. In this paper,
we focus on the medical data to address the following question: How is it possible
to share and aggregate medical data for research purposes?
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Collecting medical data raises privacy concerns as these data are of a personal
nature to the patient. Additionally, in medical settings, the following require-
ments have to be considered: the ability to update the data about a patient
(without creating multiple entries corresponding to the same person), and the
possibility to recontact the patient through the caregiver that uploaded the data.
Our aim is to create an infrastructure for medical data management that
allows the healthcare professionals to release patients’ data for research pur-
poses while insuring patients’ privacy. To achieve this we employ generalization
and pseudonymization techniques. We use binary trees to represent the data
generalization and multi-key searchable encryption for generating pseudonyms.
The contribution of this paper is the following: we propose a secure frame-
work for independently and asynchronously sharing, aggregating and searching
health data in the cloud, therefore without trust to the server that stores the
health data. We have chosen the cloud-based approach because it allows patients
and caregivers to access aggregated healthcare data from everywhere anytime
(according to the access control policy speciﬁed by the patient). Moreover, it
facilitates the aggregation of the data and the creation of the database for the
research purposes (RSDB).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a use
case scenario, in Section 3 we provide the knowledge about encryption scheme
and anonymity approach that we use in our work, and we compare our solution
with the existing approaches. In Section 4 we describe the architecture of our
proposed eHealth system, the protocol for sharing and accessing patients’ data
in the cloud, and our algorithm for constructing research database. In Section 5
we discuss privacy threats and countermeasures. We present the conclusion and
future work in Section 6 of the paper.
2 Use Case Scenario
The treatment of certain diseases, such as cancer, HIV, or other serious medical
conditions, relies on the administration of critical drugs used to keep those life-
threatening diseases under control. Those drugs (e.g. Efavirenzum, Imatinib)
have a narrow therapeutic range and a poorly predictable relationship between
the dose and the drug concentration in the blood, which may greatly vary among
individuals. Therapeutic Drug Monitoring (TDM) aims at improving patient
care by monitoring drug levels in the blood and adjust a dosage individually.
In order to ensure a better prediction of the relationship between dose and drug
concentration a Bayesian TDM approach [12] has been developed. This approach
requires population health data to be collected and analyzed by researchers, there-
fore, building databases for medical research is of a high importance [8]. We con-
sider a patient, P, who visits several caregivers during the treatment (e.g., when
there is a need for a consultation from particular specialists, in case of traveling,
or if patient has moved). We expect that the patient P is able to access his health-
care information and to decide with whom to share it. Storing data in the cloud
allows an access from anywhere anytime. However, the question of privacy has to
be addressed.
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Fig. 1. Use case scenario
A widespread use of the the electronic identity cards and the cards provided
by the insurance companies shows that having a smartcard is not a burden in
everyday life. Therefore, we assume that a patient could use a smartcard to
store a set of cryptographic keys for encryption/decryption of the sensitive data
(contained in EHR) in order to prevent an un-authorised access.
For example, as it is shown on Figure 1, a set of the Electronic Health Records
(EHRs) may belong to the same patient but could be generated by diﬀerent
caregivers. Each EHR then will be encrypted with the key shared between the
patient and the caregiver that generated this EHR. The access control policy
can be based on sharing the keys with the caregivers to allow access to the data
for the treatment. Patients’ data can also be collected for the secondary use.
Anonymization algorithms are required to preserve patient privacy.
3 Related Work
In this section, ﬁrst, we recall the details of multi-key searchable encryption
scheme [20] that we employ in our solution to generate pseudonyms and annotate
EHRs. Second, we describe (k, km) − anonymity property [21] that we impose
on the research database and preserve while updating RSDB in the distributed
environment. Finally, we present an overview of the related work and specify
how they diﬀer from our approach.
3.1 Multi-key Searchable Encryption
Without loss of generality we can assume that the server stores documents (a
set of EHRs) encrypted with m diﬀerent keys k1, ...km, and a user (patient, or
caregiver) that possesses n keys (n ≤ m) wants to search for T words (e.g.,
diagnosis, date of visit, etc.) w1, ...wT in the documents.
According to the prior work [5,23], in order to perform the search of a word
over the documents encrypted using diﬀerent keys a user has to compute a token
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Fig. 2. An example of the access graph
for each word under every key. In this case the complexity of the search will be
O (nT ). However, with an approach proposed in [20] the complexity of the
multi-key search over encrypted data does not exceed O (n+T ). The multi-key
searchable scheme is constructed using bilinear maps on elliptic curves [4]. The
pseudocode for the multi-key searchable encryption scheme and its implementa-
tion can be found in [13].
According to the scheme if a user has an access to the keys k1, ...km in order
to search for a word w he needs to compute only a single search token for this
word: tkkiw using the key ki, and deltas, {Δki→kj}, an additional information
that allows to adjust the token (tkkiw ), computed with the key ki, to the tokens
corresponding to the keys k1, ...km ({tkkjw : j = i, j ∈ {1...m}}). These deltas
represent the user’s access to the documents, and, most important, these deltas
can be reused for every search, so the user needs to generate them only once.
Eﬃciency of the scheme has been evaluated and it was shown that performance
overheads of using multi-key searchable encryption scheme are modest [13].
In the paper [20] the authors use graphs to represent an access to the shared
key. We modify the structure of the access graph by using the labeled graph
instead. This allows us to reduce the complexity of the graph. For p patients
and c caregivers access graph according to the approach used in [20] will contain
at most p+c+p∗c nodes and p∗(1+c) edges, while in case of using labeled graph
it will take as most p+c nodes and p∗c edges for the complete access graph. This
makes access control policy easier to interpret and manage. Each node of the
graph represents a patient or a caregiver. Figure 2 shows an example of access
graph. The edge (between Pi and Cj) shows that Pi visited Cj (e.g., P1 visited
caregivers C1, C2 and C3), therefore patient Pi and caregiver Cj connected with
the edge share the key that Cj will use to create a pseudonym and encrypt the
data about Pi. Labels on the edge shows the keys Pi shared with the caregiver
Cj , (e.g., P1 shares with C1 the keys P1 generated together with C2 and C3,
therefore allowing C1 access the data about P1 generated by C2 and and C3,),
however no label on the edge between P1 and C3 indicates that the only data
about P1 that C3 can access are the data generated by C3.
3.2 Anonymity of Medical Data
A variety of models, (e.g., –diﬀerential privacy, k − anonymity [24], (km) −
anonymity, l − diversity, etc. [11]) can be used for privacy preserving data pub-
lishing. However, Poulis et al. show that all these methods are not appropriate
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for the anonymization of the datasets containing both relational (i.e., single-
valued) and transaction (i.e., set-valued) attributes, such as medical datasets
that contain patient demographics and diagnosis information together [21].
(k, km)−anonymity proposed in [21] ensures that for any record r in the dataset
and any set of m or less items in transaction attribute of r, there should be at least
(k − 1) records that are indistinguishable from record r. However, k − anonymity
for relational attributes (i.e., existence of at least (k−1) records that are indistin-
guishable from record r with respect to relational attributes of the record r) and
(km) − anonymity for transaction attribute do not imply (k, km) − anonymity.
Poulis et al. developed two frameworks that produce (k, km)−anonymous datasets
with bounded information loss in one attribute type (relational or transaction)
and minimal information loss in the other (transaction or relational). Our algo-
rithmic solution (presented in the Section 4) addresses the problem of maintaining
(k, km) − anonymization property in a distributed environment.
3.3 Existing Approaches
Using encryption combined with pseudonymization techniques [9,17,26] has been
proposed recently for building eHealth system in the cloud. There exists also a
number of architectures that employ Attribute-Based encryption (ABE) scheme
[14–16,19,27]. However, these approaches have several limitations. ABE still
can leak information from the access control policy. Encryption, in general, may
aﬀect the system performance especially when there is a need to search over
encrypted data for a particular information. In our work we use multi-key search-
able encryption scheme [20], for which it was shown that performance overheads
of using this scheme are modest [13]. In [17,26] the authors suggest a patient-
centric architecture and propose to use the smartcards for the key management.
If the smartcard is lost it is very diﬃcult to recover the keys. However, in our
solution the keys can be recovered through the caregivers.
Urovi et al. in [25] proposed a secure mechanism for EHR exchange over a
Peer to Peer (P2P) agent based coordination framework. In this approach the
encrypted heterogeneous data are exposed over a P2P network. The authors pro-
vide the algorithms for searching and for publishing the EHRs in the untrusted
P2P network without compromising the privacy, integrity and the authenticity
of the shared data. This work, however, does not cover the aggregation of the
data for the research purposes, as we propose here.
Using unambiguous pseudonym for the patient [18] allows one to infer addi-
tional information about a patient by linking the data from diﬀerent sources.
In case of using multiple pseudonyms, as in [26], their eﬃcient management is
problematic. To solve these issues we generate patients’ pseudonyms with the
means of the multi-key searchable encryption scheme proposed in [20]. We also
use this scheme to enable eﬃcient search over the EHRs.
In [6] the authors describe privacy-preserving distributed k−anonymity algo-
rithm that allows merging two local k − anonymous datasets while preserving
k − anonymity property in the resulting dataset. However, the solution is not
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Fig. 3. Architecture overview
scalable and requires using SMC, sharing data is not independent among dif-
ferent sources contributing to the RSDB. Baig et al. [2] suggest a model called
-cloning for privacy protection in multiple independent data publications. How-
ever, it cannot be applied in our settings because it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the utility
of the data. In [3] the authors proposed an architecture that allows collecting
the patients consents for sharing their data for the research in an anonymous
way. However, the authors assume that the data are already anonymized.
4 Proposed e-Health Architecture
In this section, we describe our proposed eHealth system. Figure 3 shows an
architecture that consists of the following entities: Databases (Local Database,
on the client side, Data Repository, and Research Database, both hosted on the
cloud server); Cryptographic Module on the side of the client; Anonymization
Module (on both sides); and standalone Certiﬁcation Authority. Local Database,
LDB, belongs to the caregiver and contains healthcare data about the patients
that receive treatment from this caregiver. Data Repository, DR, is hosted on
the untrusted cloud server and stores EHR generated in diﬀerent medical insti-
tutions. Anonymized patients data for the research purposes are stored on the
cloud server in Research Database, RSDB. Cryptographic Module consists of
three parts and its functionalities are the following: to perform multi-key search-
able encryption; to encrypt EHR before uploading to the cloud server in order
to share with the other caregivers, as well as to decrypt when accessing EHR
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according to the access control policy speciﬁed by the patient; and, to generate
the signature to ensure the authenticity of the data. Anonymization Module is
a realization of the algorithm for medical data anonymization presented further
in this paper. Certiﬁcation Authority, CA, is a service that is responsible for
issuing certiﬁcates of public keys and smartcads for storing private keys that are
protected with the PIN known only to the owner of the smartcard.
4.1 Data Structure
Hereafter we describe the structure of the data that are stored in the databases.
– Pseudonym(s) – a set of uniquely identiﬁable patient data, IDP , (such as
combination of date of birth, place of birth and the name) that is encrypted
using multi-key searchable encryption scheme proposed in [20], stored in all
databases: DR, LDB and RSDB.
– QID – quasi-identiﬁers – a set of the attributes ({qid}) that in combination
can uniquely identify the person (e.g., single-valued qid, such as age, gender,
address (i.e., ZIP code) and set-valued qid, such as diagnosis codes), gnrlQID
– a combination of generalized qid (in a form of a binary string), with which
the data about P have been uploaded to the RSDB.
– Healthcare data – drug intakes (time, dosage, drug name), co-medications,
concentration measurements (time, measurement) – multiple attributes, that
can be set-, or single-valued)).
– Cryprographic keys and deltas – a set of the deltas for the keys (KSP,Cj , j ∈
1,N , i = j) related to the patient and shared with Ci (see Subection 3.1 for
more details).
– Encrypted data – health data, or, EHR, encrypted with symmetric cipher
(e.g., AES).
– Searchable data – EHR or a list of the attributes that describe the content
of the EHR (encrypted using multi-key searchable encryption scheme).
– Anonymized data – consist of generalized QID (gnrlQID) and a subset of
healthcare data from LDB.
StRSDB – is a table that characterizes the current state of the (k, km) −
anonymous RSDB. For each combination of qid that are presented in RSDB,
StRSDB stores the following information: PsNumber – a number of diﬀerent
pseudonyms from RSDB associated with the same QID set and the sources of
data (Ci that uploaded the data, and PsNumberi, a number of pseudonyms asso-
ciated with this QID). One has to notice that as RSDB is (k, km)− anonymous,
PsNumber ≥ k and ∑i∈1,N PsNumberi = PsNumber. Figure 4(c) presents an
example of StRSDB.
We also assume that each database stores date/time of inserting a record;
in DR and RSDB the signature of every record is stored together with PKC,
public key of a caregiver that uploaded the data and sigh them. Figure 4 shows
the examples of LDB (a), RSDB (b) and the representation of the metadata of
RSDB, StRSDB, on Figure 4(c). The data from this particular example show
the dosage of the drug and its actual concentration in the blood for a group of
patients.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 4. Example of data representation in LDB (a) RSDB (b) and StRSDB (c)
4.2 Sharing and Accessing Patient’s Data for the Treatment
Hereafter we present a protocol for storing and accessing patients’ data in DR.
– Step 1. Patient generates a shared key (using a hash-function H and a
random number r1′) with Caregiver (C1) he visits, this key will to be used
for multi-key searchable encryption scheme: KSP,C1 = H(SKP ‖ r1′) .
Since this scheme does not support decryption, the data need to be
encrypted twice: once for searching, and once with a traditional encryp-
tion scheme like AES, for decryption. Unique AES encryption key (KDP,C1)
also has to be generated for the caregiver visited by the patient.
The keys are generated from the Patient’s secret key with the use of a
smartcard or a mobile device.
– Step 2. At the Caregiver’s oﬃce Patient has to transmit the keys to Care-
giver’s machine using card-reader device in the Caregiver’s oﬃce or through
a secured channel in the encrypted form: CT 1 = Enc
(KSP,C1 ,KDP,C1
)
PKC1
.
To ensure integrity Patient’s signature (Sign (CT 1)SKP) and Patient’s public
key (PKP) for veriﬁcation are also required.
– Step 3.When the EHR is generated the content is encrypted with the shared
keys (CT 2) and signed with the secret key of Caregiver (Sign (CT 2)SKC1 ),
CT 2 = 〈EncS (EHR)KSP,C1 ,Enc (EHR)KDP,C1 〉.
To improve eﬃciency the indexable version of the encryption scheme proposed
in [13] can be used. One can also apply encryption algorithm for searching only to
A Cloud-Based eHealth Architecture for Privacy Preserving Data Integration 593
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Binary trees for qids: age and gender (a), and any set-valued qid (b)
the list of the keywords that describes the content of the EHR, such as patient’s
ID (IDP ), caregiver’s qualiﬁcation, date of the visit, symptoms, etc. Pseudonym,
with which EHR can be associated in LDB of C1: PS1P = (Enc
S (IDP )KSP,C1
) is
generated using patient’s set of uniquely identiﬁable patient data encrypted with
the shared key for search. Therefore, a Caregiver will be able to ﬁnd and update
the data about Patient in an eﬃcient way.
Visiting a caregiver Patient can decide what data stored at DR he wants to
share. For instance, to provide Caregiver 1 an access to the EHR generated by
Caregiver 2, he only needs to share with Caregiver 1 the keys shared between
Caregiver 2 and Patient:
(KSP,C2 ,KDP,C2
)
. To be able to retrieve Patient’s EHR(s)
based on the pseudonyms (or an attribute of EHR) a caregiver has to submit
to Cloud Platform, CP, a token generated for the IDP (or an attribute), as well
as the deltas for other keys related to the patient, in order to let CP adjust the
token. Token and deltas are to be computed according to the scheme described
in [20].
4.3 Anonymization of Patients’ Data for Research Purposes
In this subsection we present a description of the algorithm that allows to release
medical data for the research purposes from diﬀerent LDBs independently, while
preserving the anonymity property of RSDB. We ensure that given the consent
of the patient caregivers will be able to update RSDB with the data about the
patient without creating multiple entries that correspond to the same person.
Our solution also provides a possibility to recontact the patient through a care-
giver that uploads the data.
We consider N Caregivers that may upload the data to RSDB. We assume
that RSDB is initialized as (k, km) − anonymous, i.e., an algorithm to achieve
(k, km) − anonymity proposed in [21] had been applied to the local dataset to
build the initial version of RSDB. For each qid there exist a binary tree, according
to which generalization is performed. Figure 5 presents an example of binary
trees that are constructed for the single-valued QID: age and gender (Figure 5(a))
and also shows an example of representing a set-valued attribute (Figure 5(b)).
Our algorithm scales for any number of qids.
Figure 6 shows the pseudocode of the RSDB update algorithm and the gen-
eralization procedure used in the algorithm. The algorithm for RSDB update
has to be executed every time a caregiver Ci wants to update RSDB with the
data about patient P. First, Ci has to check whether he already uploaded the
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1: PSP ←LDB
PSP
PS
P
2: helthcareData←LDBhelthcareDataPS
P
3: if LDB
gnrlQID
PSi
P
is not empty then
4: gnrlQID = LDB
gnrlQID
PSi
P
5: else
6: tempPS←SearchOver(PSP , {ΔKSP,Ci →KSP,Cj
})
7: if tempPS = ∅ then
8: if ‖ tempPS ‖= 1 then
9: gnrlQID←tempPS.LEASTgnrlQID()
10: PSP ←tempPS.PSP
11: else
12: gnrlQID←MergePseud(k, tempPS)
13: end if
14: else
15: gnrlQID←Gener(QID)
16: end if
17: end if
18: insert(PSP , gnrlQID, helthcareData)
(a)
procedure Gener(QID)
V IEW←StRSDB
for i = 0; i < (‖ QID ‖ −1); i + + do
di = 0
depthi = qid.length()
newTqid = 
newFqid = 
while (di =
depthi) ∨ (∃gnrlqidT , gnrlqidF : (gnrlqidT =
V IEW.QID[i]) ∨ (gnrlqidF = V IEW.QID[i]) ∨
(newTqid is a prefix of gnrlqidT ) ∨
(newFqid is a prefix of gnrlqidF )) do
newFqid =
newTqid+QID[i].substring(d, d + 1)
newTqid = newTqid+QID[i].substring(d, d+1)
di = di + 1
end while
V IEW←V IEW ∨ (V IEW.QID[i] =
newFqid.substring(0, (d − 1)))
end for
return V IEW.QID
end procedure
(b)
Fig. 6. Pseudocode of the RSDB Update Algorithm (a) and Generalization (b)
data about P to the RSDB. He can query his LDB with the patient pseudonym
PSiP , generated using the shared between P and Ci key KSP,Ci . If the value in a
column gnrlQID in a raw that corresponds to the PSiP is not empty, then some
data about P are already presented in RSDB with a combination of generalized
QID that is described by the vector of binary strings, each represents gnrlqid.
In this case Ci associates the data of P with these gnrlQID that corresponds
to PSiP (lines 3,4 of the algorithm presented in Figure 6(a)). Otherwise, Ci has
to perform a SearchOver procedure to check whether there are some data
about P that had been upload to RSDB by another caregiver Cj , j = i (line 6 ).
However, this is only possible if P trusts Ci to check this (i.e., if P gave Ci an
access to the KSP,Cj – key shared between P and Cj).
If SearchOver procedure returns a single pseudonym, Ci will update RSDB
with the P’ data with gnrlQID that corresponds to PSjP (lines 8-10 ). If the result
of SearchOver contains more than one pseudonym, Ci checks whether there is
a possibility to merge the pseudonyms related to P by applying MergePseud
procedure (line 12 ). Afterwards, Ci will update RSDB by uploading the data of
P with (the least generalized) gnrlQID that corresponds to PSjP . If SearchOver
procedure returns empty set, then the Gener procedure is performed (line 15 ),
and as its output, a combination of the least generalized gnrlQID is generated
based on the StRSDB and the P’s QID.
SearchOver(PSP , {ΔKSP,Ci→KSP,Cj }) procedure takes as an input the follow-
ing data: patient’s pseudonym (PSP ) generated with the key shared between the
patient and caregiver Ci (KSP,Ci); and a set of the deltas ({ΔKSP,Ci→KSP,Cj }) – val-
ues generated for the keys ({KSP,Cj , j ∈ 1,N , i = j}) related to the patient and
shared with the caregiver Ci. Then, according to the schema proposed in [20], a
server, which hosts RSDB, can perform a search for all the pseudonyms ({PSP })
generated by diﬀerent caregivers with their keys (KSP,Cj , j ∈ 1,N ) (adjusting a
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pseudonym generated by the caregiver Ci with key (KSP,Ci) to the one generated
by the caregiver Cj with key ( KSP,Cj ) without learning neither identity of P, nor
the key KSP,C) over the column that stores pseudonyms in RSDB. As a result a
set of pseudonyms together with gnrlQID that corresponds to each pseudonym
are being returned.
MergePseud(k, tempPS) allows to check whether it is possible to merge
pseudonyms that correspond to the same patient but generated by diﬀerent
caregivers. It returns the least generalized gnrlQID and merges pseudonyms if
does not violate anonymity property of RSDB. The input is a parameter k and
a set of pseudonyms discovered at the previous step.
Figure 6(b) shows the pseudocode for Gener(QID) procedure that is per-
formed to create the least generalized gnrlQID for the QID of the patient whose
data have not been yet upload to RSDB (or the data about the patient P might
have been uploaded by the caregiver Cj , but a caregiver Ci that wants to upload
the data about patient P for the ﬁrst time does not possess the key KSP,Cj ). Input
of the procedure is QID – an array of binary strings, each corresponds to one
qid. Binary strings are constructed according to the representation of the QID
using binary trees. During the execution each qid is considered one after another
(the order is based on the importance of the qid) and generalized qid is formed
by querying ﬁrst gnrlQID column of StRSDB, and then a view created based
on the previously generalized qid. The goal is to ﬁnd the least generalized set
gnrlQID for a QID of the patient such that StRSDB already contains at least k
entries with this set gnrlQID without disclosing the QID.
5 Discussion
In this section we analyze the limitations of our model and possible privacy
threats. We also suggest the countermeasures against the threats.
5.1 Limitations
We assume that caregiver is trusted, meaning that he respects the medical ethic
and will share the data about his patient (including the data produced by other
caregivers for the treatment of this patient) only according to the access control
policy speciﬁed by the patient. However, if (by any reason) the patient does not
want the caregiver to be able to access patients’ data that are stored in the
cloud, a new key has to be created, the data have to be re-encrypted on the
server side, e.g., with the means of a proxy re-encryption scheme [1]. We also
require an existence of a certiﬁcation authority that provides the certiﬁcates for
public keys and is able to check the identity of a caregiver to ensure that the
data aggregated in RSDB have been uploaded by a real doctor. However, CA
does not have an access to the patients healthcare data.
A caregiver C can perform a MergePseud procedure only before he makes
the ﬁrst update of RSDB. Therefore, in order to merge pseudonyms the following
strategy can be applied. According to the access control policy speciﬁed by the
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patient a caregiver that possesses the largest number of the keys may perform
SearchOver and MergePseud procedures every time after de-generalization
protocol is executed. This will decrease the number of pseudonyms, with which
the information about the patient had been uploaded by diﬀerent caregivers.
With the proposed algorithm we only preserve the utility of the RSDB. How-
ever, to improve utility of the data from RSDB, the possibility to de-generalize
the data from RSDB without violation of patients’ privacy (during bounded time
interval) need to be considered. To deﬁne the requirements and selection criteria
for gnrlqid to be de-generalized are the next steps in our future work.
Generalization step (procedure Gener of the algorithm) requires going
through all the qid one by one. However, we assume that the number of qids
stored in the RSDB is not high and qids are ordered based on their importance
with respect to the requirements to the RSDB.
5.2 Possible Threats and Countermeasures
If a patient loses his smart card, all the keys can be recovered from the LDBs of
the caregivers that treat the patient. If the smartcard was stolen it is still diﬃcult
access the data or to modify the access control policy for anybody except the
patient, because the card is protected with PIN code that is known only to the
owner of the card. The limit of attempts to insert a valid PIN code can be set
up to prevent brute-force attack.
We assume that the cloud server, where RSDB and DR are hosted, is honest
but curious (it executes protocols and the algorithm correctly but tries to learn
about the patient as much as possible). For example, some additional location
information can be inferred from the IP address of the device that transmits
the data from LDB, and these data could be more precise then gnrlqid that
stands for the patient address. Therefore, this can violate (k, km) − anonymity.
A straightforward countermeasure is to hide the IP address from the cloud server,
e.g., using HTTP proxies or anonymous communication service like Tor [7].
Caregivers could potentially link pseudonyms related to the same patient
using the column PrevPS in case of pseudonyms merging. To prevent this during
the procedure of merging the pseudonyms, the previous pseudonym has to be
encrypted together with the information about the caregiver that had created
this pseudonym. The cipher text and a parameter that will indicate how many
times the pseudonym had been updated will be stored in the column PrevPS.
Then, it will be possible to ﬁnd the caregiver that initially uploaded the data
(i.g., in case of legal issues), through the caregiver(s) that merged pseudonyms.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed an architecture of a secure and scalable privacy-
preserving eHealth cloud system (that allows to store and eﬃciently search over
patient data used for the treatment), and an algorithm that allows to build a
database with patients’ data for the research purposes.
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In future work we will focus on the implementation of the architecture pro-
posed in this paper and on its evaluation using a synthetic dataset (http://omop.
org/OSIM2), and real patient data from our medical partners in the framework
of ISyPeM2 project (www.nano-tera.ch/projects/368.php). We will also work
towards de-generalization of RSDB to improve utility of the data. Finally, we
will focus on improving eﬃciency of proposed solution by extending representa-
tion of the QID (from binary trees to n-ary trees) and employing agent based
coordination model for the construction of RSDB.
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